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Recent Developments
The Exceptions That Disprove the Rule? The Impact of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia on Exceptions to the Sovereignty Principle. By Gregory
Dubinsky
On August 7, 2008, Georgia initiated a military operation to seize South
Ossetia, a separatist region within internationally recognized Georgian
territory. Russia, whose troops were stationed as peacekeepers in South
Ossetia, responded with force and expelled the Georgian military. The origins
of the conflict are a matter of dispute. Critics of Russia argue that its presence
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another separatist region, was aimed at
perpetuating Georgia's internal divisions, while others hold Georgia
responsible for provoking the conflict and for aggressive actions against its
purported citizens.' On August 26, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
announced Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states. 2 To date, only Nicaragua has followed suit. 3 Russia's
controversial decision followed on the heels of another prominent secession:
in February, the United States and several European Union members, among
others, recognized the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, a
province of Serbia that had been under U.N. administration since 1999.
Kosovo's declaration of independence explicitly stated that it was "a special
case" related to the breakup of Yugoslavia and "not a precedent." 4
Nonetheless, Kosovo's declaration of independence was met by protests from
Russia and other states with minorities that have potential claims to
nationhood. As Medvedev said in an interview with the BBC on August 26:
"If Kosovo is a special case, [Georgia] is also a special case." 5 Given Russia's
rejection of Kosovo's special claim to independence, this statement can mean
one of two things: both are special cases, or neither is.
These recent events have revived the sovereignty debates surrounding
other disputed territories in the post-Soviet space. Two of these de facto
states-Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Transnistria in Moldova-claim
independence based on grievances not dissimilar in principle from those of
Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The creation of each of these de facto
states is a product of the breakup of multiethnic states and, with the possible
exception of Transnistria, each premises its claim to independence on ethnic
1. Georgia's claims that its invasion of South Ossetia was an act of self-defense against
imminent Russian aggression have since been largely discredited. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, RUSSIA VS
GEORGIA: THE FALLOUT (2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.orgfhomc/index.cfm?id=5636; C.J.
Chivers & Ellen Barry, Georgia Claims on Russia War Called into Question, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008,
at Al.
2. President Dmitry Medvedev, Statement, Aug. 26, 2008, available at http://www.
kremlin.n/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml.
3. Nicaragua Recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia, REUTERS, Sept. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.cornarticle/gc07/idUSN0330438620080903.
4. Text of Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, Feb. 17, 2008, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/news/world/2008-02-17-kosovo-independence-text N.htm.
5. Interview with Dmitry Medvedev (BBC television broadcast Aug. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docslwarfarelstatement260808en6.htm.
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nationalism. Until recently, however, none of the four post-Soviet de facto
states had reasonable hopes of legal recognition by an established nation.
Deadlock in the U.N. Security Council is likely to prevent U.N. accession for
Kosovo or other de facto states for the foreseeable future, but it will not
preclude the possibility of a suddenly unfrozen "parade of ethnicities" in the
post-Soviet space.
This Recent Development examines Moscow's rationale for recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its potential application to other disputed
post-Soviet territories. It argues that Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia has extended the grey zone of partial recognition ushered in by
Kosovo and has set the stage for a proliferation of ethnonationalist states.
Russia's rationale, using a similar logic to the case for Kosovo, lays bare the
absence of consensus on the application of international law on separatism
and self-determination of peoples to multiethnic, former Communist states.
The state of affairs between Georgia and the separatist regions at the
start of the August 2008 conflict was set in motion more than ten years prior.
Against a backdrop of increasing tensions between ethnic Abkhaz and ethnic
Georgians in the final years of Soviet rule, Abkhazia separated from Georgia
in a war from 1992-94 that saw the expulsion from Abkhazia of over 200,000
ethnic Georgians. 6 The Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces
in 1994, with the approval of U.N. Security Council Resolution 934,
established a Russian-led peacekeeper presence under the mandate of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 7 In 1994, Abkhazia set forth a
constitution declaring itself to be a "sovereign democratic state" based on the
right of nations to self-determination. 8 A U.N. observer force, UNOMIG, was
created in 1993 and empowered by the Security Council to monitor the
separation of Georgian and Abkhaz forces and the CIS peacekeeping force.
9
In the years since, internationally sponsored peace negotiations between
Abkhazia and Georgia have failed.
South Ossetia has been de facto independent from Georgia since a 1990-
92 conflict that followed a declaration by the South Ossetian government of
its intent to join North Ossetia in Russia. As recently as 2004, Georgia and
South Ossetia signed a ceasefire and a demilitarization pact after a failed
Georgian attempt to remove the South Ossetian leadership from power. In
August 2008, after weeks of escalating tit-for-tat violence, the Georgian
6. At the time of the 1989 Soviet census, Abkhaz residents constituted only 17% of the
population of Abkhazia, while Georgians constituted 44%. Monica Duffy Toft, Multinationality,
Regional Institutions, State-Building, and the Failed Transition in Georgia, in ETHNICITY AND
TERRITORY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 123, 140 n.24 (James Hughes & Gwendolyn Sasse eds.,
2002). In 2006, according to the International Crisis Group, ethnic Georgians made up "at least" 25% of
the population of Abkhazia. INT'L CRIsis GROUP, ABKHAZIA TODAY (2006), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cftn?l 1&id=4377.
7. Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, Geor.-Abkhazia, May 14, 1994,
reprinted in U.N. SCOR, Letter Dated 17 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/583
(May 17, 1994); S.C. Res. 934, U.N. Doc. S/RES/934 (June 30, 1994).
8. ABKHAZIA CONST. art. 1 (1994), available at http://www.abkhaziagov.org/
ru/state/sovereignty.
9. S.C. Res. 858, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/858 (Aug. 24, 1993).
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government launched a major military operation to bring South Ossetia under
its control. Russia, claiming authority under its peacekeeping mandate, met
this move with a swift military response, driving Georgia's forces from South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. It allowed separatist militias to expel additional ethnic
Georgians from the two territories and occupied swaths of Georgian territory,
before gradually withdrawing to the borders of the disputed states.
Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia a few weeks after
the conflict was predicated as a special exception to the normally inviolable
sovereignty of a fellow state. Given the brutality of the August conflict,
Moscow maintained, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians could no longer be
expected to remain within the same polity as the Georgians. To support this
claim, Medvedev cited several bodies of international law on sovereignty and
the rights of statehood: the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations, the U.N. Charter, and the Helsinki Final
Act of 1975.10 The Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, a defining
statement of the post-World War II consensus on sovereignty, holds that each
state enjoys "territorial integrity and political independence" that are
"inviolable."'" Yet the Declaration also recognizes the right of peoples to
"self-determination,"12 a major component of international law that creates
space for external legitimation of a state's sovereignty.
1 3
The Declaration recognizes "the establishment of a sovereign and
independent State" as one of the "modes of implementing the right of self-
determination," but also obliges signatories to "refrain from any action aimed
at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of
any other State or country."'14 The right is included in Articles 1 and 55 of the
U.N. Charter, but it is unclear what groups the framers meant to include in the
term "peoples." 15 The Helsinki Act defined self-determination similarly,
without explicitly clarifying what constitutes a people: "all peoples always
have the right, in full freedom, to determine . . . their internal and external
political status."
'1 6
In his speech announcing the recognition-which he called "the only
possibility to save human lives"-Medvedev laid out the factual basis for his
argument. 17 He accused Georgia of committing "genocide" in the August
conflict with the objective of "annexing South Ossetia through the
annihilation of a whole people" and claimed "the same fate lay in store for
10. Medvedev, supra note 2.
11. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations].
12. Id. at 124.
13. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990).
14. Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 11, at 124.
15. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self Determination in the United Nations Era, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 304 (1994).
16. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, art. l(a)(viii) (Aug. 1,
1975), 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
17. Medvedev, supra note 2.
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Abkhazia."' 18 To establish Georgia's persistent lack of good faith in political
accommodation with the Abkhaz and South Ossetians, he drew upon the
history of Georgia's first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who initiated a
series of actions, such as the downgrading of South Ossetian autonomy and
the barrinp of regional parties, aimed at minimizing non-Georgian political
influence. 9 He asserted Russia's role throughout the duration of the separatist
conflicts as a "mediator and peacekeeper .... guided by the recognition of
Georgia's territorial integrity., 20 These allegations led to his conclusion that
Georgia alone had always meant to resolve the dispute by force. The August
war, which was the ostensible culmination of this bad intent on Georgia's part,
"dashed all the hopes for the peaceful coexistence of Ossetians, Abkhazians,
and Georgians in a single state." 2 1 As proof of the free exercise of Abkhaz and
Ossetian self-determination, Medvedev cited the separatist governments'
appeals for recognition and referenda favoring independence held in Abkhazia
(1999) and South Ossetia (1992 and 2006). In an elaboration of his decision,
Medvedev set out his broader vision of self-determination, introducing the
term "nation" into the discourse of recognition: "Not all of the world's nations
have their own statehood. Many exist happily within boundaries shared with
other nations." 22 When "some nations find it impossible to live under the
tutelage of another," they exercise their legal right to freely determine their
political status. 23 Although the right to self-determination is ascribed to
"peoples," Medvedev's use of "nation" aimed to establish the legitimacy of
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist governments as self-determining
units.
24
The right of self-determination, however, has traditionally been
25bestowed to national movements in the context of decolonization, where
there are clearer demarcations between colonists and ruled. In contrast, the
muddied and complex relationship between ethnic groups and territory within
postimperial states recently carved from multinational states such as the
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia is not easily transposed into this framework.26
18. The allegation apparently stems from Georgia's artillery bombardment of Tskhinvali, the
South Ossetian capital. However, Russian claims about the number killed in South Ossetia have been
found to be inflated. See, e.g., A Caucasian Journey, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2008, at 43.
19. Gamsakhurdia held office from 1991 to 1992. Robert English, a scholar of the region who
has lived in Georgia, compares him as a nationalist leader to Slobodan Milogevi& Robert English,
Georgia: The Ignored History, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22011.
20. Medvedev, supra note 2.
21. Id.
22. Dmitry Medvedev, Why I Had to Recognise Georgia's Breakaway Regions, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2008, at 9 (Asia ed.).
23. Id.
24. It also provokes the question: if "nations" are the units of self-determination in
international law, what does this imply for ethnic groups spread out in multiple states, such as the
Ossetians, who are concentrated in North Ossetia, a Russian republic, and de facto independent South
Ossetia, or for the Kurds, who inhabit swaths of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey?
25. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 129-30 (1995).
26. Kosovo's moves toward a civic, as opposed to ethnically based, concept of nationhood
(for example, by choosing not to adopt the Albanian flag) belie the fact that ethnic Albanians comprise
90% of the population and that most Serbs living in the northern part of the province do not recognize
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The main criterion for international recognition of post-Soviet states was the
status of "union republic" in the Soviet Union, which Georgia held and
Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not. In the federal system of the former
Yugoslavia, Kosovo was also apportioned a lesser degree of sovereignty than
fill-fledged republics. Although Russia does not go so far as to contest the
validity of the recognition of the other post-Soviet states on the basis of their
legal status within the Soviet Union, its arguments from history-arguing
Georgia's territorial claims to the regions to be a mere Stalinist carryover
2 7 -
potentially indicate its willingness to challenge the legality of other sovereign
arrangements in the post-Soviet space as well.
Indeed, there are no major limiting principles to self-determination
within the formula advanced by Moscow. Its rationale for recognition makes
central the allegation that the separatist ethnic groups can no longer negotiate
in good faith with the Georgian government. Rather than advance an inherent
right to independence for the separatist regions, Russia attempts to establish
the legitimacy of its recognition on the grounds of a morally and practically
untenable coexistence of the minority Abkhaz and Ossetians and the majority
Georgians. The Abkhaz and Ossetian right to statehood is based on an
inevitably subjective determination that there has been an irreparable
breakdown in Georgia's ability to deal on a good faith basis with the Abkhaz
and South Ossetian peoples.
This framing establishes a calculus of independence with a chain of
logic that is widely encompassing. According to the Russian rationale, the unit
of self-determination is a territorial region populated by an ethnic minority
population. This region could be a de facto independent polity, but it has at
least an organized political structure claiming to be representative of its
population. 28 It is engaged in good faith negotiations with its de jure
government, which is ruled by an ethnic majority group. The sovereign then
commits an egregious act against the separatist region; the possibility of
coexistence is closed off; and the sovereign's putative right to territorial
integrity is superseded by the imperative of self-determination. An irreparable
breach of good faith has no particular threshold degree of egregiousness:
although Russia justified its recognition of South Ossetia by alleging genocide,
it claimed that the mere risk of genocide occurring was sufficient cause to
recognize Abkhazia. There is also no mention in Medvedev's speech of the
Kosovar rule. Announcing Washington's recognition of Kosovo, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice noted "the history of ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo to conclude that "independence is the only viable
option." Press Release, Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent
State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/ 100973.htm.
27. Interview with Vladimir Putin (CNN television broadcast Aug. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/29/putin.transcript.
28. Russia does not predicate its argument on the effectireness of separatist governance in the
breakaway regions. This is likely because Abkhazia and South Ossetia are dependent on foreign,
particularly Russian, aid and assistance. Yet the post-Soviet de facto states claim to be functioning
governments to justify recognition of their statehood. Dov Lynch, Separatist States and Post-Soviet
Conflicts, 78 INr'L AFF. 831, 835-36 (2002). Under the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States, states possess four criteria: a permanent population, a defined territory, government,
and a capacity to have relations with other states. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States art. I, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
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U.N. resolutions that affirmed Georgia's territorial integrity; for Russia, these
commitments are presumably abrogated by the actions of the Georgian
government. 29 This omission, which has the effect of subrogating precedent
under the banner of the special exception, has ramifications for the
international resolution of other post-Soviet separatist conflicts.
To provide contrast to the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
Moscow has held up Chechnya as a model for how a formerly separatist
region is retained within a larger multiethnic state, citing the 2003 referendum
that reaffirmed Chechnya's place within the Russian Federation. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov linked the referendum to an exercise of self-
determination of the Chechen people, though he gave no special humanitarian
justification for its right to a referendum. 30 Chechnya, like Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, was a lesser republic in the Soviet Union, but Russia
nonetheless implicitly recognizes its putative right to self-determination---one
that theoretically could conflict with its sovereignty. By affirming such an
expansive exercise of self-determination in the separatist regions, Russia has
given its own separatists legal ammunition for their cause.
The sizeable gap between practice and theory of international law on the
right to self-determination in the post-Soviet sphere is likely to come into
starker relief in the wake of Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be seen in
years to come as having highlighted the void currently inhabited by de facto
states, as well as stateless ethnic minority groups. Why Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, but not Kosovo, should qualify under Moscow's rationale is unclear;
likewise, why Kosovo, but not Abkhazia and South Ossetia (or Darfur, or
Xinjiang), has a unique claim to independence is in the eye of the beholder.
The presence of Russian troops in some disputed territories and the possibility
of de facto states choosing to merge into other nations present further
complications. Russia's focus on the centrality of the ability to negotiate in
good faith in separatist disputes speaks to the notion of consent: the manner in
which territorially distinct minority populations can legitimately revoke their
consent to be ruled by a sovereign state, a process that is currently ill-defined.
This recent development calls for reexamination of the principle of self-
determination, which was codified during decolonization and the Cold War.
Given the realities of power and sovereignty in the international system, this
would be a difficult process resisted by powerful countries that have invested
stakes in certain legal outcomes. As the Abkhazia and South Ossetia cases
have demonstrated, however, a rule can only have so many exceptions until it
is no rule at all.
29. When asked why Russia repeatedly recognized Georgia's territorial integrity in U.N.
resolutions before the August war, Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin replied,
"[t]hat was then. This is now." Patrick Worsnip, U.N. Council Still Divided on Georgia Resolution,
REUTERS, Aug. 21, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.conlarticle/gc07/ idUSN2126455820080822.
30. On June 2, 2006, in reference to holding a referendum in South Ossetia, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov stated, "The issue of self-determination is part of international law, which is
carried out through an expression of will [of the people] . . . Russia was not afraid to push for this
referendum in Chechnya and it was held." S. Ossetia Sets Repeat Independence Referendum, Civ.
GEOR., Sept. 11, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id= 13522.
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The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA). By Margot Kaminski*
Intellectual property (IP) law is on the verge of a drastic change.
Thirteen countries have stepped outside of the existing system of treaties and
organizations to create a plurilateral agreement that will significantly elevate
the enforcement of copyright law worldwide. The overenforcement of IP law
raises concerns on an international scale. Personal privacy, freedom of
expression, access to education, innovation, and the proportionality of
sanctions to offenses are at stake.
In the past decade, interest groups ranging from nonprofits to the
governments of developing countries have protested the expanding scope of
IP enforcement. The debate has raged predominantly around the 1994
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), I which removed IP enforcement from the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and placed it in the hands of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). In more recent years, developing countries have been
drawing attention to inequities in TRIPS and have successfully pushed for
initiatives more reflective of their interests within WIPO. Just as these
changes have started to occur, however, a group of countries whose economic
and political interests align more with IP producers than consumers ("IP
maximalists," in the terms of the debate) has quietly begun orchestrating the
same strategic forum shifting that birthed TRIPS in the first place. This time,
the new agreement will be external to any existing multilateral organization;
the future of copyright enforcement will be determined outside the bounds of
organizational legitimacy and accountability.
The proposed plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
would usher in radically stronger enforcement, including increased criminal
sanctions and stronger border measures. ACTA is poised to create a new
world: one in which criminal sanctions are mandated against peer-to-peer file
sharing internationally; governments do legal work on the part of corporate
content owners; companies that rely on parallel imports (such as eBay) lose
their business model; laptops or iPods may be searched at borders; and the
information gleaned from border searches will be shared among border
authorities of signatory countries. In light of its enormous potential impact,
the shroud of secrecy under which ACTA is being constructed is highly
troubling. With no open negotiating process, and no draft publicly available,
ACTA is a black box that could contain a bomb.
By most estimates, the new regime will prove significantly more
draconian than TRIPS. ACTA will likely be an amalgamation of the strictest
enforcement measures from numerous countries, and lack the crucial
exceptions that are currently built into individual countries' laws. This Recent
* I would like to thank Eddan Katz of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) for his help
familiarizing me with the backdrop for ACTA. I would also like to thank Gwen Hinze of EFF for her
extensive help with criticisms, comments, and contextualizing references on earlier versions of this
piece.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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Development will outline the areas of international law most likely to be
affected by ACTA and will discuss the real world implications of imposing
enforcement measures from the top down, without adequate international legal
process.
As with much of transnational law, the concept of international
harmonization in IP law is a relatively new phenomenon. The first
international IP treaty, the Paris Convention, was signed in 1883 by only
eleven countries. Its sister treaty, the Berne Convention, was signed three
years later. These treaties became the basis for WIPO, created in 1967 as a
specialized agency of the United Nations. WIPO served as a venue for treaty
negotiations and soft law rather than a source of uniform standards or
enforcement measures. WIPO continues to exist today, providing soft law and
other resources, but the bulk of international IP regulation now stems from the
WTO.
In 1994, international IP law radically changed with the incorporation of
intellectual property rights into the newly created WTO, through TRIPS.
Laurence R. Helfer convincingly argues that TRIPS represented regime
shifting on the part of the United States and the European Community,
moving IP law from WIPO to the WTO.2
Helfer argues that the United States and the European Community
benefited from a shift to the WTO for three reasons: they had more
negotiating power in the WTO than in WIPO; they could link IP to numerous
other trade concerns; and the WTO dispute settlement system was seen as
extremely effective. 3 In other words, the WTO had teeth, and WIPO did not.
TRIPS set the first minimum international standards for copyright,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, integrated
circuit designs, and trade secrets.4 For the first time, these obligations could be
enforced internationally through trade sanctions, effectively forcing many
countries to sign on to heightened levels of protection against their own
interests. 5 TRIPS also included subject material in patent law that had not
been standardized internationally: pharmaceutical products, animal varieties,
plant varieties, food products, and chemical products, to name a few. Further,
it granted copyright in computer programs; prior to TRIPS, only twenty
countries protected computer programs through copyright.
6
This version of IP maximalism had significant consequences.
Developing countries argued against shifting to the WTO, knowing that they,
as IP importers, would stand to suffer from the change.7 Since the adoption of
TRIPS, developing countries have rallied. In August 2001, the least developed
2. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
3. Id. at 21-22.
4. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 26
(Daniel Chow & Edward Lee eds., 2006).
5. Brazil held out against the TRIPS agreement until the United States applied trade
sanctions under its unilateral Special 301 process. Then Brazil agreed to sign on to TRIPS. See PETER
DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY?
135 (2002).
6. Id. at 124.
7. Id. at 133.
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countries (countries designated by the United Nations as exhibiting the lowest
indicators of socioeconomic development), adopted the Zanzibar Declaration,
highlighting several TRIPS-related problems. Their concerns included the
transfer of technology under Article 66.2 of TRIPS, access to medicines, an
extension of the transitional period for implementing TRIPS, and
8reaffirmation of the flexibility of TRIPS. The WTO responded with the Doha
Declaration, adopted on November 14, 2001. 9 The Doha Declaration affirmed
that member states have the right to grant compulsory licenses for medicines
in cases of public health emergencies. No country has yet implemented
compulsory licensing for medicines, but it is an important example of the at
least nominal flexibility of TRIPS in the context of the WTO.
WIPO has also been influenced by a TRIPS-related backlash. In 2004,
Brazil and Argentina called for a development agenda in WIPO, citing a
"knowledge gap" and a "digital divide" between the wealthier nations and
their poorer counterparts.' 0 International interest groups ranging from research
scientists to governments rallied around these concepts, forming the "access to
knowledge" movement." In October 2007, WIPO formally established the
Development Agenda, adopting a set of forty-five recommendations, and
established a Committee on Development and Intellectual Property.'
2
It should be of no surprise that IP maximalists have chafed against the
backlash. Maximalist countries have been pushing for a TRIPS-plus regime,
adding new requirements to the TRIPS standards through bilateral and
regional trade agreements.13 Since 2001, they have stepped up the pressure,
perhaps in response to the increased emphasis on the interests of developing
countries in WIPO and the WTO. Their new agenda pushes for further
movement toward U.S. intellectual property law, including stronger
criminalization measures against copyright infringement, and provisions on
the anticircumvention of technological protection measures similar to those
contained in the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). This
agenda is what Susan K. Sell deems the "TRIPS-Plus-Plus regime."' 14 Sell
identifies multiple initiatives reflecting this extraorganizational pressure:
ACTA, Interpol's SECURE, and WIPO's Advisory Committee on
Enforcement (ACE) discussions, among others. As Sell writes, this new round
8. Meeting of the Ministers Responsible for Trade of the Least Developed Countries,
Zanzibar Declaration, WT/L/409 (Aug. 6, 2001).
9. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)IDEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
10. U.N. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO] Gen. Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and
Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, II, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004).
11. For a definition of the "access to knowledge" movement, see Jack Balkin, What Is Access
to Knowledge?, Balkinization, Apr. 21, 2006, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/what-is-access-to-
knowledge.html.
12. WIPO, General Report, 267-334, U.N. Doc. A/43/16 (Nov. 12, 2007).
13. See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791, 792-807 (2001) (describing the bilateral agreements negotiated by the European
Community and the United States with developing country governments as "TRIPS-plus").
14. Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts (June 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/
files/SusanSellfinalversion.pdf.
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of agreements bypasses multilateral fora like WIPO and the WTO and
pressures countries or weaker regions into bilateral compliance.
1 5
ACTA is part of this carefully calculated movement to increase IP
protection outside of the existing venues of WIPO or the WTO. What makes
ACTA a more radical turning point than even the existing bilateral agreements
is that it aims to create not an agreement between several countries, but a
global standard on copyright infringement, without going through any true
multilateral process. It attempts to apply IP maximalism from the top down,
rather than allowing individual countries to choose appropriate levels of
sanctions and protection. Since there is important legislation on precisely the
same issues pending in, for example, the European Union, ACTA represents a
clear attempt to bypass internal process in addition to multilateral process.16
The United States, the European Union, Japan, and Switzerland began
the push for ACTA's adoption; other countries invited to participate include
Australia, Canada, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore,
and the United Arab Emirates. 17 Argentina, Brazil, and China have not been
invited to participate in initial negotiations. What this implies is that countries
with stronger interests in IP exporting will be responsible for drafting the
language of ACTA, while countries that sign on later will not have any
influence over its terms. With so many large economies linked to ACTA,
other countries will struggle to hold out against its provisions.
The justifications behind ACTA are suspect. In linking trademark
counterfeiting to copyright infringement, ACTA dangerously and perhaps
deliberately conflates two disparate issues. ACTA inappropriately harnesses a
growing vocabulary of indignation against the harms of counterfeiting, and
applies it against copyright infringement. In 2003, INTERPOL linked
counterfeit goods to terrorist financing.1 8 The initial Japanese proposal for an
anticounterfeiting and antipiracy agreement was justified by an interest "in the
safety and security of consumers," particularly those who die from counterfeit
medicines.19 It is hard to argue against increased enforcement against terrorist
financing and deadly drugs. It is significantly easier, however, to argue that
teenagers downloading music should not be subject to similarly increased
sanctions.
ACTA has been forming under the watchful eye of global superpowers
for several years. Japan announced a proposal for an anticounterfeiting20
agreement in late 2005. The United States independently proposed a similaragreement in late 2006. In October 2007, they were joined by Switzerland and
15. Id. at5.
16. Report on the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Criminal Measures Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, EUR.
PARL. DOC. (COM(2006)0168 - C6 0233/2005 - 2005/0127(COD))(2007).
17. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Document Library/FactSheets/2008/asset upload file760_ 15084.pdf.
18. Intellectual Property Crimes: Are Proceeds from Counterfeited Goods Funding
Terrorism?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int ' Relations, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Ronald
K. Noble, Sec'y Gen., INTERPOL), available at http://www.interpol.intPublic/ICPO/
speeches/SG20030716.asp.
19. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Japan Proposes New IP Enforcement Treaty, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p= 135.
20. Id.
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the European Community in announcing a more formal joint treaty.2 1 Nine
additional countries participated in informal discussions in the following
months, and official negotiations were held in 2008 over the course of
meetings in June, July, and October. 22 As of the publication of this piece,
further negotiations are slated to take place in 2009.2
3
Thus far, no draft of ACTA has been circulated. Bodies external to the
negotiating process have no clear sense of ACTA's terms. The most recent
document to attempt to sketch out in detail ACTA's potential impact was a
white paper published by IP Justice in March 2008, which points to areas of
potential impact but does not propose specific language nor identify
differences between ACTA and current international standards. 24 In the
absence of a draft agreement, this Recent Development aims to further flesh
out the context of ACTA's potential terms by examining the text of U.S. Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs). The FTAs give a clear idea of what aspects of IP
law the United States Trade Representative is most likely to export abroad.
ACTA is described as an enforcement agreement. Its architects
repeatedly affirm that it is not meant to change the scope of rights protection,
at least from the perspective of U.S. law. Rather, it is aimed at "improving
enforcement practices" by strengthening cooperation and ratcheting up
25
sanctions. However, there are substantive differences between existing U.S.
FTAs and international law, which suggest how ACTA will transform
international law.
A leaked 2007 Discussion Paper from the U.S. Trade Representative's
office outlines three areas ACTA will affect: International Cooperation,
Enforcement Practices, and Legal Framework.26 The last category suggests
that despite declarations to the contrary, ACTA is indeed meant to create new
substantive law, rather than to serve as a mere statement of cooperation under
existing international law.
The International Cooperation section of the Discussion Paper
emphasizes information sharing and suggests opportunities for public and
private advisory groups to share best practices with governments. This section,
combined with other aspects of U.S. FTAs, raises concerns over "regulatory
capture," whereby government institutions are used to protect private IP
interests. Items listed in the Enforcement Practices section also include formal
or informal advisory groups and specialized IP groups within law enforcement
21. Press Release, The Hon. Simon Crean MP, Austl. Minister for Trade, Australia To
Negotiate an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Feb. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2008/sc_012.html.
22. In August 2008, the European Commission proposed a mandate from the European
Parliament for the negotiation of ACTA. As of publication, this mandate was scheduled for a plenary
vote on December 18, 2008.
23. Nic Suzor, Elec. Frontiers Austl. (EFA), DFAT Briefing on the Current State of ACTA
(Oct. 25, 2008), http://www.efa.org.au/2008/10/25/dfat-briefing-on-the-current-state-of-acta.
24. ROBIN GROSS, IP JUSTICE WHITE PAPER ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT (ACTA) (2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/03/25/ipj-white-paper-acta-2008.
25. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab Announces
U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement To Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2007/0ctober/Ambassador-Schwab-Announce
s USWillSeekNew Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes.html.
26. DISCUSSION PAPER ON A POSSIBLE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT,
http://wikileaks.org/leak/acta-proposal-2007.pdf [hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER].
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structures. This Discussion Paper was leaked prior to the latest round of
proposed U.S. copyright law amendments, which create the role of a separate
"P czar" to handle IP enforcement.27 The Discussion Paper thus suggests that
a movement toward specialized IP enforcement agencies was a foregone
conclusion on the part of its U.S. negotiators.
The Legal Framework section proposes further criminal enforcement
against IP infringements, increased border measures, changes in civil
enforcement, and an explicit international incorporation of elements of the
DMCA. In comparing the Legal Framework section of the Discussion Paper
to U.S. FTAs, six topics stand out as areas ACTA is likely to modify: (1) the
scope of rights protected by copyright; (2) the type of infringement incurring
criminal sanctions; (3) the level of criminal sanctions; (4) exceptions to or
limitations on infringement; (5) border measures and ex officio authority; and
(6) the scope of civil sanctions.
If the U.S. FTAs are any indication, ACTA will set a new international
standard on what sort of behavior constitutes copyright infringement. ACTA
will export a more expansive definition of the scope of copyright protection,
without exporting the limitations that exist in U.S. law. Under existing
international copyright treaties, the scope of copyright varies from country to
country. Two of the most sensitive areas in copyright law are the "making
available" right and temporary reproductions. Placing "making available"
under the scope of copyright protection implies that one can be held liable for
copyright infringement for merely having made a work available online-
without the burden of proof that any downloads actually occurred. Temporary
reproductions, such as those used in the distribution of information online, are
another controversial aspect of copyright law. Since 2002, U.S. FTAs have
required trading partners to both accept the "making available" right and treat
temporary and transient reproductions as copyright infringement. 28 This
pattem strongly suggests that similar language will be incorporated into
ACTA.
ACTA will unquestionably alter the current international standard for
criminal sanctions against copyright infringement. Under TRIPS, countries
must at minimum hold a person to have committed an act of criminal
copyright infringement if he or she has willfully infringed on a commercial29
scale. An example of this sort of behavior is the mass reproduction and sale,
for profit, of pirated DVDs. ACTA may change the current international
requirement of willfulness and the scale at which infringement must occur for
it to be considered criminal. The ACTA Discussion Paper language is notable
for four reasons: (1) it explicitly links criminal enforcement to border
measures; (2) it omits the TRIPS "willful" requirement with regards to
27. President George W. Bush signed the PRO-IP Act into law on October 13, 2008. See
generally Steven Schwankert, Bush Enacts PRO-IP Anti-Piracy Law, PC WORLD, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/152214lbushenacts_proip antipiracylaw.htmil.
28. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 18.4, June 20, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 642,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Republic of KoreaFTA/
SectionIndex.html [hereinafter U.S.-S. Korea FTA].
29. "Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in
cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." TRIPS, supra note
1, art. 61.
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infringement on a "commercial scale"; (3) it criminalizes willful
infringements without any motivation for financial gain, provided that they
are "significant" and "prejudicially affect the copyright holder;" and (4) it
adds criminal sanctions for trafficking in counterfeit labels.
30
Most significantly, the Discussion Paper expands the international
definition of "commercial scale" to include "private financial gain," which is
the standard in U.S. law, and to explicitly include "significant willful
infringements without motivation for financial gain to such an extent as
prejudicially affect the copyright owner (e.g., Internet piracy).",31 Thus, under
ACTA, one would be held subject to international criminal sanctions for
large-scale copyright infringement, without explicit willfulness or motivation
for financial gain in the commercial sense. This standard potentially
criminalizes any large-scale copyright-infringing activity, as long as such
behavior can be shown to prejudicially affect the copyright holder through the
depletion of an expected market. The downloading of copyrighted files or
collection of copyrighted research "for private financial gain" may be found to
meet this standard. The danger of this standard is that there is no minimum
definition provided for "commercial scale," and no requirement that the scale
of the infringement be willful, as long as each individual infringement is
willful. This standard has the potential to criminalize the behavior of an
enormous number of individuals, worldwide.
ACTA will substantively change the mandated sanctions against
infringement. TRIPS allows for criminal sanctions to include fines or
imprisonment and sets no minimum standards for either.32 TRIPS also allows
(but does not require) seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of goods.33 The
Discussion Paper language does not provide specifics about criminal sanctions,
but calls for criminal procedures for enforcement and specifically focuses on
forfeiture as a remedy.34 If it mirrors recent U.S. law and U.S. FTAs, ACTA
will mandate that a signatory provide for criminal fines and imprisonment.
35
ACTA will likely impact the exceptions and limitations to copyright law
internationally. Countries currently have discretion to enact copyright
exceptions and limitations under areas reserved to them as a matter of national
sovereignty, according to the exceptions and limitations incorporated in the
Berne Convention and the Three Step Test in Article 13 of TRIPS.36 ACTA
may override countries' existing copyright exceptions and limitations in favor
30. DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 26, at 2-3. For U.S. law, see 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
31. DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 26, at 2-3.
32. "Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to
provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding
gravity." TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 61.
33. "In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and
destruction of the infringing goods." Id.
34. DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 26, at 3 (proposing giving officials "authority to seize and
destroy IPR infringing goods").
35. U.S.-S. Korea FTA, supra note 28, art. 18.10.27 (requiring "penalties that include
sentences of imprisonment as well as monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent to future
infringements, consistent with a policy of removing the infringer's monetary incentive").
36. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13. See also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works art. 9, Sept. 28, 1979, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (stating that it "shall be a matter for legislation
in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided
that such reproduction does not ... unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author").
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of U.S. law. Alternatively, it may create a strong international standard for the
scope of copyright protection without mandating any limitations, such as fair
use.
Moreover, ACTA will significantly increase border measures. The
Discussion Paper suggests that ACTA will give customs officials the authority
to disclose information about infringing shipments to holders of IP rights, as
well as the authority to seize and destroy infringing goods, changing the
current evidentiary standard.37 There is no indication that ACTA will include
the TRIPS allowance for de minimis imports, as it is not included in any of the
U.S. FTAs. Since ACTA's language on infringements expands to prohibit
infringements even "for private gain," it may even explicitly eliminate the
TRIPS allowance for de minimis imports.
38
Finally, ACTA seeks to change international standards on the scope of
civil sanctions by changing the requirement of preliminary measures,
including ex parte searches and the preservation of documentary evidence,
and by mandating statutory damages internationally.3 9 The Discussion Paper
indicates that ACTA will require signatories to implement statutory damages,
which presently do not exist in all national copyright laws (Australia is a
notable exception). Additionally, by taking a position on the question of
whether statutory damages are penal or remedial, ACTA may have the effect
of policy laundering within the United States. Currently, there is an ongoing
debate within the United States on whether statutory damages are penal, and
therefore should be strictly construed, or are remedial, and therefore can be
applied more broadly. ACTA's push toward the remedial approach suggests
that statutory damages within the United States are more broadly applicable.
ACTA is of central significance in three respects: on procedural grounds,
regarding the rights of developing nations, and from a civil liberties
standpoint. 40 On procedural grounds, ACTA bypasses international
institutions in favor of plurilateral treaties. ACTA's urgency has been
emphasized by a focus on the economic impact of counterfeiting on U.S.
industry and the insinuation that counterfeiting supports terrorist organizations.
Such grandstanding attempts to sneak in substantive changes in other aspects
of international IP law under the banner of moral infallibility.
Regarding the rights of developing nations, ACTA is meant to include
measures targeted at developing countries, but it does not include any of the
41major developing countries with IP interests in its negotiating process.Alarmingly, the countries that have finally been able to address concerns over
37. DiSCUSSION PAPER, supra note 26, at 3.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 3 (mandating "damages adequate to compensate"); see also Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Oman, art. 15.10.7, Sept. 26, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Oman FTA/Final Text/SectionIndex.html (requiring "pre-established
damages"); Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Frade, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/consultationissues.htmt (last visited Dec. 4, 2008) (inviting
discussion of "issues related to the incorporation of a system of pre-established or statutory damages in
IP matters").
40. See generally GROSS, supra note 24.
41. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 17, at 3 (stating that "[w]e look forward
to partnering with developing countries through ACTA").
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technology transfer raised by TRIPS will have no say in the construction of
ACTA.
From a civil liberties standpoint, ACTA raises serious concerns both in
the substantive legal changes it proposes and in the scope of its enforcement
measures. Incorporating much of U.S. law, ACTA may have the same results
as the DMCA. As Fred von Lohmann of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
writes, "the DMCA has harmed fair use, free speech, scientific research, and
legitimate competition." 42 ACTA is not meant to be a comprehensive
intellectual property agreement, but its influence will likely extend beyond its
proposed bounds. ACTA targets counterfeiting and piracy, and as such, will
not explicitly address matters of patent law. Many goods, however, are subject
to multiple types of intellectual property protection. For example, while
generic medicines may be outside of the explicit scope of ACTA, their
movement between countries may be affected by trademark or copyright
issues.
Perhaps most frightening are the privacy implications of the increased
enforcement measures, particularly information sharing between customs
officials of different governments, as well as among governments, Internet
service providers (ISPs), and private content holders. The Discussion Paper
tries to settle an ongoing international debate over the role of ISPs in policing
Internet content, by proposing "procedures enabling right holders . . . to
expeditiously obtain information identifying the alleged infringer.",43 This
proposal places new requirements on ISPs with regard to content holders, with
troubling privacy implications for content users.
Furthermore, as Robin Gross of IP Justice points out, increased
government surveillance is a key component of ACTA, and the privacy
protections available in different countries vary greatly. The most extreme
view of ACTA sees it as ushering in regular warrantless searches and seizures
on borders, including searches of laptops and portable media players such as
iPods.44 Currently, the scope of border measures is being litigated in the
United States. 45 ACTA seeks to preempt that litigation and impose policy
from the treaty down.
ACTA stands poised to radically increase international IP law
enforcement. The agreement reflects a form of international bullying, whereby
economically powerful countries, frustrated by the blockades erected in
international fora they once supported, have stepped outside those fora to
create new standards. However, as the application of these standards within IP
maximalist countries has already shown, stringent IP enforcement techniques
can threaten innovation and civil liberties. The worst-case scenario of ACTA
would be to expand those standards into countries with even fewer protections
for civil liberties. Unfortunately, this result is not far from the expected
42. Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF Marks 10th Anniversary of DMCA with Report
on Law's Unintended Consequences (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/l0/27.
43. DISCUSSION PAPER, supra 26, at 4.
44. Matthew Ingram, Do We Need Copyright Cops?, Ingram 2.0, May 27, 2008, http:/Iwww.
theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080527.WBmingram2008O527120809PWBStory/WBmin
gram.
45. Kelly Fiveash, EFF and Churns Sue Feds over Border Laptop Inspections, THE REGISTER
(U.K.), Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/02/08/eff alc sueshomelandsecurity.
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outcome. The best that can be hoped for is that as the fight for the future of IP
plays out in the international arena, interest groups, both nonprofit and for-
profit, will effectively raise objections within negotiating countries to derail
some of ACTA's most troubling provisions.
